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Abstract. Many software development practices aim at ensuring that
software is correct, or fault-free. In safety critical applications, require-
ments are in terms of probabilities of certain behaviours, e.g. as asso-
ciated to the Safety Integrity Levels of IEC 61508. The two forms of
reasoning – about evidence of correctness and about probabilities of cer-
tain failures – are rarely brought together explicitly. The desirability of
using claims of correctness has been argued by many authors, but not
been taken up in practice. We address how to combine evidence concern-
ing probability of failure together with evidence pertaining to likelihood
of fault-freeness, in a Bayesian framework. We present novel results to
make this approach practical, by guaranteeing reliability predictions that
are conservative (err on the side of pessimism), despite the difficulty of
stating prior probability distributions for reliability parameters. This ap-
proach seems suitable for practical application to assessment of certain
classes of safety critical systems.
Keywords: Correctness, survival probability, conservative bounds, soft-
ware safety standards
1 Introduction
For critical applications of computers, it is important to demonstrate low enough
likelihood that design faults (in particular software faults) cause, in operation,
failures with severe consequences. A form of evidence that can support such
claims is experience from either previous operation, in the same conditions as
those for which the demonstration is needed, or “operational” testing that re-
produced those conditions. Such evidence is often not offered in a suitable form.
Other forms of evidence are usually provided, often generically called “pro-
cess” (or indirect) evidence: that methods believed to reduce the risk of defects
were applied in development and verification and validation; and that the faults
of concern are indeed likely to be absent (e.g., certain properties have been for-
mally proved, stringent inspection or testing methods failed to detect faults, any
fault revealed and considered important was fixed). Such process precautions are
required by most standards for safety-critical (and security-critical) software.
Indeed, the process evidence required by a standard for a given criticality of
the software’s functions is often the only evidence brought to support a claim
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that the software will fail with acceptably low probability. But this use of the
evidence is not supported by current software engineering knowledge [1, 2]. The
methods documented are considered by their proponents to reduce the likelihood
of faults; but we have really no scientific bases for claiming that a specific set
of precautions will achieve a failure rate, or a probability of failure per demand,
below a specific threshold as required by the system of which the software will
be a part (e.g. a SIL level in IEC61508 [3]). Even if these methods do reduce
the number of faults, fault numbers or fault densities are not sufficient to enable
estimation of a failure rate or pfd.
There is a use of “process” evidence that could directly support claims of
low probability of failure: as supporting belief in absence of faults. The goal of
the process precautions is to avoid faults; and for products that are inherently
simple, this goal might be achieved. Software about which a verifier concludes,
by detailed analysis and/or proof, that it is correct, sometimes is correct. A
fault-free software product has zero failure probability, over any duration of
operation. We cannot generally claim to know that a software product is fault-
free with certainty; but we could bring convincing evidence about a probability
of it being so, and this probability may be high enough to help in proving that
the risk in operation is low enough. A formal introduction to this approach and
more complete arguments in its favour were given many years ago [4]; we return
to it to propose a concrete approach to its application. Advantages of reasoning
this way would include:
– the probability of pfd= 0 is a lower bound on the software’s probability of
failure-free behaviour over any arbitrarily long period of operation (a serious
advantage when making predictions for long-lived systems).
– while probabilities of failure per demand, or failure rates, depend on the
frequencies of the various demands in the environment of use (the operational
profile) of the system, a claim about probability of absence of faults would
accompany a product to each new use for which the range of demands and the
required responses are the same. Such relatively environment-independent
claims would for instance be useful for the practice of ”Safety Element out
of Context” described in ISO26262 [5].
Many different words are used for properties similar to what we discuss, say-
ing e.g. that the software is “correct”, or “free from faults” (or “from defects”),
or “perfect”. We choose the term “fault-freeness”. Independently of the name
used, to avoid logical fallacies one needs to apply this term carefully according to
the context. We are interested in safety critical, software-based items; then, we
will mean by “software faults” those that would cause behaviours that violate
safety requirements when the software is used in the context of interest; and
by “failures” those with respect to these safety requirements. Similar restrictive
definitions could be applied for the case of software that is critical for security.
Different definitions will apply in different contexts. For instance, a subcontrac-
tor may wish instead to demonstrate that the software it delivers satisfies the
written specifications in its contract, irrespective of whether they are correct,
and thus define “faults” and “failures” with respect to these specifications.
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Assessments of the probability of operating for a period of time without
safety failures are formally reliability predictions (reliability with respect to that
subset of possible failures). In our mathematical treatment, we assume a system
for which the reliability parameter is a probability of failure per demand (pfd);
our approach can easily be extended to systems for which the reliability model
is an exponential, continuous-time model, with a failure rate as its parameter.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 examines how to use a claimed probabil-
ity of fault-freeness Pp towards claims of actual interest, namely probability of
failure-free operation (reliability) over prolonged operation (possibly a system’s
lifetime). Section 3 discusses how to integrate via Bayesian inference evidence
from failure-free operation to improve the claimed reliability; it shows how to
avoid the crucial difficulty of choosing a prior distribution and obtain predictions
that are guaranteed to be conservative (not to err on the side of optimism). Sec-
tion 4 positions our contribution with respect to other past and ongoing work
on related approaches. Last, Section 5 examines how a claim of a certain Pp can
be supported, and addresses the crucial issue that absolute certainty of fault-
freeness can never bee achieved, even for a product that is indeed fault-free. The
last section discusses the value of the reported results and future work.
2 Reliability predictions using a probability of
fault-freeness
An advantage of reasoning with claims of fault-freeness is that they define lower
bounds on long-term reliability, irrespective of the use (demand profile) to which
the item will be subjected.
Reliability predictions based on a claimed probability of fault-freeness take
a simple form: given a probability Pp of fault-freeness, the reliability of the
item at any future time t, R(t), satisfies R(t) ≥ Pp. Thus, in particular, being
able to claim a reasonably high Pp is a desirable option for systems with an
operational life of many demands but that will not receive operational testing
over a comparable number of demands. For instance, let us imagine a system
with an intended lifetime of 10,000 (statistically independent) demands. To be
90% sure that it will not suffer any accident due to the software, we would need
to demonstrate pfd≤ 10−5; but we would get at least the same confidence if we
could claim a 90% probability of fault-freeness.
We expect that claims based solely on probability of fault-freeness would
not be accepted in many application domains: users, regulators and the general
public would want to know some bound on the probability of failure for the
case that the software has faults. But such confidence bounds on the pfd can be
obtained from past operation or operational testing.
For instance, if we had 90% confidence that an item of avionic software
has no faults such as to cause catastrophic failure, this by itself satisfies the
regulatory requirement that catastrophic failures due to this equipment be “not
anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one
type”, “usually expressed” as “probability on the order of 10−9 or less” per
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flight-hour [6] (the often-quoted “10−9” requirement which has been forcefully
argued to be infeasible to demonstrate statistically [1, 7]). Yet, the possibility
that, in the unlikely (10% probability) case of faults being present, such faults
cause a high probability (say 1%) of failure per flight, would probably seem
unacceptable: some evidence would be required that even if faults are present
the pfd would still be low. But this evidence would not need to demonstrate the
10−9 requirement. A much more modest claim, together with the probability
of fault-freeness, would ensure a forecast of low enough risk during the early
life of the aircraft type; and as operation continues, failure-free operation would
increase the likelihood that the software is indeed fault-free, or if not, that its
probability of failure is indeed very small.
We proceed to discuss this combination of evidence from operation or oper-
ational testing with probability of fault-freeness.
3 Inference from operation or testing
We examine now how to improve a reliability claim that includes probability of
fault-freeness by adding evidence from operation or testing, if no failures (of the
failure types of interest) have been observed.
Bayesian inference from operational testing is well understood. The unknown
pfd is seen as a random variable, which we will call Q, with a prior probability
density function fQ(q). After observing success on tpast independent demands,




(1− q)tpast+tfut fQ (q) dq∫ 1
0
(1− q)tpast fQ (q) dq
(1)
According to the previous discussion of probability of fault-freeness, the prior
distribution for the unknown pfd has the form
R (tfut|tpast) = fQ (q) = Pp δ (q) + (1− Pp) fQn (q) (2)
where δ(q) is Dirac’s delta function; fQn (q) is itself a probability density
function, for the random variable “value of the system pfd conditional on pfd> 0’.
After observing tpast failure-free demands, the posterior reliability is∫ 1
0
(









Pp + (1− Pp)
∫ 1
0
(1− q)tpast+tfut fQN (q) dq
Pp + (1− Pp)
∫ 1
0
(1− q)tpast fQN (q) dq
(3)
We can describe the operation of Bayesian inference as reducing the values of
the probability density function more for those values of pfd that are less likely
to be true in view of the observed failure-free operation. Thus seeing no failures
reduces the values of the probability density function for high values of pfd, and
shifts probability mass towards the origin (towards pfd = 0).
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3.1 Worst case prior distributions and worst-case reliability
A common problem in applying Bayesian inference is choosing a prior distribu-
tion for the unknown pfd, Q. Arguing from the pfd values observed for similar
software will be difficult: there has been no systematic data collection activity
that would allow this. “Expert judgement” tends then to be used. But all scien-
tific evidence is that experts’ judgement of probabilities tends only to be good
for phenomena of which they have actual experience of prediction followed by
feedback about its accuracy: textbook examples of observed good probability
prediction ability are weather forecasters and horse-racing bookmakers, who on
a daily basis assign probabilities to events and very soon observe whether the
event occurs or not. On this basis, for an expert in critical software to be ac-
curate in assigning a probability density function for a product’s pfd would be
unusual. We can expect an expert’s direct experience to include comparatively
few products, hardly any examples of pfd close to 1, and for those with high
reliability, insufficient information to judge their true value of pfd.
But for safety it is usually acceptable to demonstrate pessimistic predictions.
We can then look for a worst case prior distribution that one could assume for
the inference. We can show that such a worst case does exist, as follows. Consider
a probability density function for the unknown pfd, Q, made of two probability
masses: a mass Pp in Q = 0 and a mass (1− Pp) in Q = qN . Now, if we assume
qN to be close to either end of the interval [0, 1], reliability predictions after
observing failure-free demands will be very high. Indeed, in the two limiting
cases, predicted reliability will be 1: if qN = 1, one test is enough to show that
P (Q = qN ) = 0 and thus Q = 0 with certainty; and if qN = 0, Q = 0 with
certainty to start with.In between these extreme values, successful tests will
reduce P (Q = qN ) and increase P (Q = 0), but still leave a non-zero probability
of future failure. Thus, posterior reliability as a function of qN is highest at the
two ends of the interval, and must have a minimum somewhere in between. 1
A proof of existence of this worst-case prior distribution of pfd has two steps:
1. as a consequence of the Lemma proved in Appendix A, of all the prior
distributions with a probability mass in Q = 0, the worst-case one is indeed
a two-point distribution as above
Ps δ (q) + (1− Ps) δ (q − qN ) (4)
1 These considerations highlight another important point: a prior that is pessimistic
in terms of the reliability it implies may produce optimistic inference. Here, moving
qN closer to 1 implies, before failure-free operation, pessimism: a system likely to
fail in few demands from the start of operation. But then observing it not failing
over even few demands then logically makes it very likely to have 0 pfd (optimism).
Which prior distributions will produce pessimistic posteriors depends both on which
posterior prediction we wish to minimise (e.g. posterior reliability for tfut demands
vs posterior probability of fault-freeness) and on the specific observations (here, the
number of failure-free demands). It would thus be wrong to take from the worst-case
posterior distribution we obtain here any measure different from posterior reliability
for tfut demands, e.g. a certain percentile, or a posterior probability of fault-freeness,
and believe it to be a conservative value for use in further claims about this system.
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so that the posterior reliability (3) has the form
Pp + (1− Pp) (1− qN )tpast+tfut
Pp + (1− Pp) (1− qN )tpast
(5)
2. among all such two points distribution, we can identify a value of qN ∈ (0, 1)
that yields the lowest posterior reliability. Thus Bayesian inference can be
applied on the basis of only Pp and N , removing the major obstacle of
assessing the whole fQn(q) distribution.
Fig. 1a shows worst case posterior reliability as a function of the ratio tfut/tpast,
for various values of the prior probability of fault-freeness, Pp. We can read this
figure in various ways:
– given a certain amount of observed failure-free operation, the worst-case
reliability predicted for a comparable amount in the future is satisfactorily
higher than Pp. So, for instance, given a prior probability of fault-freeness
Pp = 0.5 for a safety critical system in — say — a car model, after observing
failure-free operation of a car fleet using that system for one year, the worst-
case probability of failure-free operation for another year, for constant fleet
size, is above 80%. Given Pp = 0.9, it would be more than 95%. However,
as the prediction extends further and further into the future, the statistical
evidence becomes less and less adequate for confident prediction, and the
worst-case reliability asymptotically falls back to Pp as tfut tends to infinity;
– given the horizon tfut over which we want to predict reliability, the plot
shows the number of tpast observations that we need to reach for the worst-
case prediction to hit our intended target. For instance, expecting a safety
protection system to have to face 100 demands over its lifetime, Pp = 0.9 and
statistical testing over 1000 demands will give probability of going through
this lifetime without failures upwards of 95%. More detail for scenarios with
very high required worst-case reliability, and extensive operational testing, is
given in Fig. 1b; the y-axis represents the probability of at least one failure
over tfut demands. If the number of test demands is much greater than the
number of demands over the intended operational lifetime2, even modest
values of Pp give substantial confidence in failure-free operational life.
A special case of reliability prediction is the reliability for tfut = 1, i.e. the
system pfd. Fig. 1d shows the number tpast of failure-free demands one needs to
observe to achieve a desired value for the worst case posterior pfd.
4 Related work
In computer science there has been for a long time an opinion sector opposing
the very idea of software reliability assessment, on the grounds that software can
be made, and thus ought to be made, correct: 100% reliable.
2 An example of current interest concerns plans for testing of the protection system of
the European Pressurised Reactor http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/
step-four/final-res-plans/resolution-plan-gi-ukepr-ci-02.pdf




Several authors [8, 4, 9] have argued for the usefulness of estimating a proba-
bility of correctness. Voas and co-authors [8] argued that given a lower bound on
the pfd that any one fault can produce (“testability”), one can infer from failure-
free testing a probability of correctness. Bertolino and Strigini published the in-
ference procedure for this case [10, 11]; however, one cannot usually demonstrate
a lower bound on the probability of failure; it is hard to demonstrate experimen-
tally that an event that is very unlikely to start with, and never observed, is
actually impossible. Thus the treatment used here, producing a worst-case pre-
diction without such assumptions, is a major step towards practical applicability.
The approach of accepting an incomplete description of prior pfd distribu-
tions, and obtaining conservative predictions by finding – among those prior dis-
tributions that match this description – the one that, combined with the actual
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observations, would yield the worst posterior value for some reliability measure
has been studied: (1) for reliability given a mean pfd [12]; (2) for the mean poste-
rior pfd, given, about the prior distribution of the pfd, (2a) a confidence level on
an upper bound [13], or (2b) some combinations among a probability of pfd= 0,
a confidence level on an upper bound and a certain upper bound [14].
Littlewood and Rushby showed how claims of “perfection” can aid assessment
of fault-tolerant systems made of diverse redundant components [15, 16].
5 Evidence for fault-freeness and “quasi-fault-freeness”
Confidence in fault-freeness depends on “process” evidence being backed by ar-
guments about why that process produces fault-free products with high enough
probability. One might for instance reason that:
1. the current product is obtained by a process by which the same organisation
produced a series of previous products (similar in their general requirements
and complexity), that have proved to be fault-free; or
2. the verification steps that show this product to be correct (e.g., proof) are
known by experience to catch a certain, high percentage of all faults, and to-
gether with estimates of the fault numbers to be expected before verification,
this yields a probability of having no faults [17, 18, 19].
There are important difficulties. The relevance of past experience – whether
the current product is somehow an anomaly in the “population” of the past
products considered – is never certain. This is just the underlying difficulty of
all statistically-based prediction, and we need not discuss it for this specific case.
But here, the past experience itself is ambiguous: in argument 1 above, we cannot
know with certainty that such past products were fault-free, but at most that
they were scrutinised in many ways, operated for a long time without failures
or problems that would cast any doubts on their correctness, and so on. As for
argument 2, it assumes that in past experience we reached certainty about the
number of faults in a product, and again such absolute certainty is impossible.
We outline here how this difficulty can be overcome in principle. Regarding for
instance case 1 above, we consider that, if a past product successfully underwent
stringent scrutiny and a long operational life, we cannot declare it fault-free with
certainty, but it has a posterior distribution of pfd where most of the probability
mass is either in 0 of close to it. The Lemma in appendix A shows that for
worst-case reliability prediction, such a distribution can be substituted with a
single probability mass in a point qS close to 0. Similar experience for multiple
similar products will also give confidence, say a probability Ps, that the same
property applies to the current product. So, for the current product, we can use
a pessimistic probability density function of pfd similar to equation 4:
Ps δ (q − qS) + (1− Ps) δ (q − qN ) (6)
(where qN accounts for the possibility that the pfd of the current system is not
as low as that of the previous systems, and could be much worse); and find
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a worst-case value of qN , as in section 3.1. For qS close enough to 0 (in view
of tpast and tfut), again the confidence Ps, together with worst case reasoning,
could give useful reliability predictions, guaranteed to be conservative.
We have outlined this solution as a chain of reasoning steps: obtaining con-
fidence in low pfds of past products; then confidence that similar confidence in
a low pfd applies to the new product; then using the latter for worst-case infer-
ence. This entire chain could instead be formalised in a single Bayesian model,
in which all similar products have pfd distributions with parameters belonging
in their turn to a common distribution, about which the operation of each prod-
uct gives some information. Such models have been studied, e.g. [20]. A natural
next step in this research is to apply them to the current problem, and check
the feasibility of their use in concrete assessment and certification contexts.
6 Discussion and conclusions
We have shown a way of using the evidence usually collected for assurance about
safety critical systems, together with experience from operation or realistic test-
ing, to achieve reliability predictions that can be proved to be conservative.
This relies on (i) using the process evidence to support a claim of “probability
of fault-freeness”; (ii) applying Bayesian inference from the observation of failure-
free operation and (iii) given strong uncertainty about the prior distributions to
use, applying worst-case reasoning.
This approach reduces the impact of important difficulties with the current
ways of stating quantitative claims about software failure in critical applica-
tions: the lack of scientific bases for deriving claims about pfd from the kinds
of favourable evidence usually produced about such software; the difficulty of
achieving enough operational or test experience to demonstrate very high relia-
bility over long lifetimes; last, the difficulty of choosing convincing prior distribu-
tions for Bayesian inference is obviated by the ability to do worst case inference.
The predictions thus obtained will not always be as high as desired, for
at least two possible reasons: (i) the evidence may simply not be strong enough
(not enough operational experience, not strong enough prior probability of fault-
freeness) to warrant as high a predicted long-term reliability as we seek; (ii) these
methods are intentionally biased towards conservatism; they avoid the risk of er-
roneous optimism by accepting potential errors in the direction of pessimism.
Of course, choosing to err in the direction of pessimism is a two-edged sword; it
avoids dangerous errors but may make the prediction useless. By way of compar-
ison, we show in Fig. 1c the posterior reliability obtained by assuming, together
with a certain probability Pp of fault-freeness, that the pfd, if not zero, has a
uniform distribution. This distribution might indeed be chosen as an “ignorance
prior”, when one does not know what prior to believe, and seem reassuringly
conservative because before observing failure-free demands, it is indeed very pes-
simistic: it means that if there are faults the expected pfd is 0.5. But this prior
conservatism is deceptive. It implies that observing failure-free demands very
quickly builds up confidence in future reliability: comparing Fig. 1c with Fig. 1a
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(and noting the different vertical scales in the two plots) shows how far this as-
sumption is from being conservative. Thus, if one has strong reasons to support
a specific prior distribution conditional on non-fault-freeness, (fQn(q)), by all
means one should use it; but our worst case reasoning will illustrate how much
of the predicted reliability hinges on believing that specific prior.
When performing inference using prior probability of fault-freeness (or of
“quasi-fault-freeness”), failure-free operation gradually builds up confidence (in-
creases predicted reliability). But observing even a single failure will radically
undermine this confidence: the posterior probability of pfd=0 becomes zero; not
being sure about our prior distribution for pfd when not zero (fQn(q)), and wish-
ing to be pessimistic, we must conclude that the pfd is indeed very high. Some
may object to this apparent “fragility” of the approach. We contend that it is an
advantage: it represents correctly the way confidence is gained for many critical
products. Indeed, if a product that was reputed to be practically immune from
design faults suffers a possibly design-caused failure, a normal reaction is to take
it out of service, find the design fault and fix it (creating a new product and a
new prior distribution of pfd); or demonstrate that the failure was not due to
a design fault; or that the design fault exists but brings an acceptably low pfd
in operation. In any case, the previous argument is discarded when the failure
undermines the belief in a pfd so low that the probability of seeing any failure
is also low. Our Bayesian formalisation faithfully represents this effect.
We strongly believe that this approach can improve the way that critical
software-based systems are assessed. However, we acknowledge that we advo-
cate the use of general evidence about the effectiveness of development methods
that is not widely available. For the time being, this approach may be useful to
organisations with strong internal data collection processes: they may well have
enough evidence to build arguments that they will consider sound for their own
risk assessments, or might support a claim made to a client or a safety regulator.
A safety regulator may use our kind of worst-case reasoning to compare against
the predictions that it has to judge in order to approve or reject a claim that
a system is safe enough for operation. A company for which wrongly optimistic
reliability predictions bring large economic risks (e.g. an automobile manufac-
turers, for which a doubt of a possible safety-critical fault may lead to massive
recalls) may use this approach to assess its own risk, both prior to deployment
and at any point in the operational life of its products.
A straightforward extension of this approach is to the case of continuous
reliability with the unknown parameter being a failure rate λ instead of a pfd.
Another important question for further investigation is whether more com-
plex Bayesian models, taking into account — for instance — experience in com-
parable products as in [20] can prove useful in practice, as suggested in Section 5,
to ensure sound inference from “quasi-fault-freeness” of past products.
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Appendix A: General lemma
If the prior probability density function of the pfd of a system is a mixture of
probability density functions fQi, then substituting any subset of these compo-
nent distributions with a set of single-point probability masses, one for each of
the fQi thus substituted, will yield a pessimistic prediction of posterior reliability
after observing failure-free demands.








fQi(q)dq = 1; pi > 0, i = 1..n ; and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.























(where without loss of generality we have substituted the single component







, i = 1..n, (9)
and the bound (8) is attained if fQ1(q) = δ(q − q1), where δ(x) is Dirac’s delta
function.
Proof
















= (1− qi)tpast+tfut ,
and (10), together with substituting (9) in (8), proves the lemma. QED.
